摘要
迈尔认为生物学本来就不是均一的科学,这对于理解生物学的性质并无益处:(1)功能生物学研究的近因问题不只是去解码遗传程序;(2)程序控制的过程未必就是合目的性的,迈尔对于合目的性与似目的性的区分也不能成立;(3)要揭示生物学的自主性,就要阐明突现在有机界和无机界中的差别。但迈尔没有注意到这一点;(4)近因问题和远因问题尽管不同,但却不是不相关的。笔者认为还不能把迈尔对于生物学的区分简单地看成新生物学哲学的基本原则。
Ernst Mayr's arguments that biology is not a homogeneous science originally, is unfavorable for understanding the nature of biology. The reasons are 1) The proximate questions which functional biology concerns are not merely matters of decoding the program of a given individual; 2) A process controlled by a program does not suffice to make a teleonomic process, and the distinction between teleonomic and teleomatic is not clear; 3) The autonomy of biology can not be clarified unless the disparity between the emergence in living things and inanimate world is interpreted, and Mayr ignored this point and;4)In spite of that there are differences between proximate and ultimate causes, which must be interrelated.
出处
《科学技术与辩证法》
CSSCI
1993年第3期4-8,63,共5页
Science Technology and Dialectics