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双方关系、关系网络、法院与政府:中国非国有企业间信任的研究 被引量:20

Bilateral Relationship, Relationship Network, Courts, and Governments: An Empirical Study on Trust among China's Private Enterprises
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摘要 以中国四省区 2 2 0家非国有企业为例 ,本文考察了决定企业间信任程度的各种因素 ,并分析了它们影响信任程度的不同作用渠道以及相互关系 ,从而实证检验了信任形成的“双方关系论”、“关系网络论”、“法院论”和“政府论”。Tobit模型回归结果显示 ,企业面临的激烈市场竞争、企业的社会关系网络、纠纷信息的有效扩散等因素都显著提高了企业对第二大客户的信任程度 ,而可能中断的业务关系以及缺乏约束合同纠纷的有效机制起到了负面作用。以上因素对信任程度的影响随业务时间长短而异 ,而且彼此之间可能相互独立、补充、或替代。研究发现支持了“双方关系论”和“关系网络论” ,否定了“法院论”和“政府论”。政策含义强调了适度的市场竞争、利用社会关系网络、保持信息传播的通畅等措施对加强信任的重要性 ,同时也指出了司法改革应当考虑到它会影响市场竞争与信息扩散因素对信任程度的不同作用 ,因此需要寻求均衡改革方案。 Utilizing a sample of 220 private enterprises across four provinces in China, this paper empirically investigates the factors affecting the level of trust among private enterprises, and their different channels and relations in determining trust. Regression results from the Tobit model show that, fierce competition, social network, and efficient information disclosure all positively affect the level of enterprises trusting their second largest clients, while negative effect presented by possible business interrupt and lackness of effective mechanism on tackling dissension. The roles of all above factors differ with the business duration, and might substitute, complement, or be independent of each other. Our findings support both “bilateral relationship view” and “relationship network view”, while reject “courts view” and “governments view” on the determinants of trust. Policy implications are: first, suitable competition, widely use of social network, and effective information disclosure should be guaranteed; second, legal reform could exert complex impact on the role of competition and information disclosure in determining trust, so the optimal reform design should pursue an equilibrium of both factors.
作者 李涛 李红
出处 《经济研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2004年第11期85-95,共11页 Economic Research Journal
关键词 非国有企业 信任程度 中国 双方关系论 关系网络论 法院论 政府论 企业间关系 Bilateral relationship Relationship network Courts Governments Trust
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参考文献25

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