摘要
通过彰显马克思的“类存在物”及其“有意识的生命活动”、“自由自觉的活动”等概念的意蕴可以使其被遮蔽了的道德哲学批判得到澄明。人作为“类存在物” ,不但指认了人是社会的存在物 ,而且指证了永恒不变之人性观的虚幻性 ,从而超越了亚里士多德的“人是政治动物”的内涵 ;使人成为“类存在物”的“有意识的生命活动”则内置了马克思对道德准则的理解 ,使他对任何的非人格化的超历史的道德形式主义的合法性产生质疑 ;而人的自由自觉的活动体现了手段性活动与目的性活动统一 ,因而成为人的终极价值和道德本体 ,这构成了对各种形式的道德目的论的批判。
It is species being that confirm human being is social being and has no eternal nature, which means more than the content of human being that Aristotle had given. By analysing species life activity, Marx formed his own moral principle and threw his doubt upon the effective of any others. Marx regarded free activity as human's ultimate value and substance of moral area, which is the unity of activity as means and as object.
出处
《伦理学研究》
2004年第6期95-99,共5页
Studies in Ethics
关键词
类存在物
活动
道德批判
species being activity moral critique