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控制权收益的成本分析

The Study of the Cost of Private Benefits of Control
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摘要 控股股东攫取控制权收益是有成本的。本文通过模型分析发现 ,控股股东在自身效用最大化目标下达到均衡时 ,单位控制权收益所产生的控制权收益成本与该单位控制权收益本应与其他股东分享的部分相等。当控股股东的股份比例上升时 ,控制权收益下降 ,公司价值上升 ;反之 ,当控股股东的股份比例下降时 ,控制权收益上升 ,公司价值下降。当外部制衡力度上升时 ,控制权收益下降 ,公司价值上升。因此 ,各种加强外部制衡力度的措施 ,将有效制约控制权收益 。 There is cost when the private benefits of control are taken. Based on a model, we find that when the controlling shareholder maximize his utility, the marginal cost of private benefits of control is equal to what should be shared with the minority shareholders. When the proportion of controlling shareholder goes up, the private benefits of control go down, but the value of corpotation goes up, and vice versa. When the external ristriction becomes better, the private benefits of control go down, but the value of corporation goes up, and vice versa. So all policies which can inprove the external restriction can restrict the private benefits of control so as to protect the minority shareholders' rights and interests.
作者 郭鹰
出处 《山东财政学院学报》 2004年第6期50-53,共4页 Journal of Shandong Finance Institute
关键词 控制权收益 成本 外部制衡 private benefits of control cost external restriction
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