分权化改革、财政激励和公有制企业改制

Decentralization, Fiscal Incentive and Privatization of SOEs in China

本文探讨了20世纪90年代地方政府积极推行公有企业改制的原因,基本结论是1994年进行的分税制改革强化了地方政府的预算约束,显著增加了地方政府的增收节支压力,但是分税制改革并没有改变改革开放以来形成的财政分权化趋势。这种财政分权化体制对地方政府具有很强的财政激励效应,地方政府具有很大的积极性追求地方经济发展和地方经济效率。随着市场竞争的日趋激烈,国有企业及其他一些公有制企业的经营绩效变差,日益成为地方财政的包袱。与此同时,非国有经济对地方经济发展和就业增长的贡献却日益增加,对地方财政的贡献也日益增大。因此,从地方政府的自身利益出发。

The paper studies the principal incentives of local governments to promote privatization in China. Based on the empirical analysis, we have the following conclusions: The 1994 fiscal reform resulted in harder budget constraints to local governments. However, it has not reversed the process of regional decentralization in China. The regional decentralization provides local governments with strong fiscal incentives. Faster development of local economies and non|state enterprises imply more local government expenditure. At the same time, the economic performance of SOEs has been worsen. The SOEs have become the fiscal burden of local governments. It implies that it could improve the fiscal conditions of local governments to develop non|state enterprises. Therefore, privatization turns out to be the optimal choice of local governments.