线性合同招标中投标人数的博弈模型研究

Game Theoretical Model on the Number of Bidders in a Linear Contract Bidding

在线性合同的假设前提下，论文通过建立模型，求解博弈的贝叶斯均衡得到了风险中性的理性招标人的最优合同形式以及投标人的最优报价策略。最后，论文通过引入招标成本函数，进一步提出了对于招标人控制投标人数从而达到自身目标最优的策略。

Under the assumption ot the rational and risk-neutral principal and agent, this paper formulates the process of bidding for a linear contract as an auction game theoretical model. By solving the model, we get the optimal linear contract for the principal and the optimal bidding strategy for the agents. In the end. we study how to get the optimal result for the principal by controlling the number of bidders if the cost function of the principal is taken into consideration.