摘要
由于委托代理关系的存在,企业投资行为通常很难达到最优状态.文章研究了经理私人利益与企业投资行为的关系.通过建立模型,我们发现经理私人利益是企业过度投资行为产生的决定因素,显性报酬只是影响经理的努力水平而与投资行为无关,进一步分析发现当股东知道经理会过度投资时,经理的行为会受到惩罚.文章认为,合理的负、完善的监督以及人力资本产权化等是解决过度投资行为的有效措施.
It is difficult that investment level is optimal because of principal-agency. The paper discusses the relationship between manager's private benefits and investment behavior. By developing model, we find that manager's private benefits is the determinant of over-investment, and manager's payoff only affects the level of his efforts. Moreover, manager will be punished if share-holder find over-investment occurs. We believes that sound debts, perfect monitoring and the acknowledge of property right of human being's capital are the solution to over-investment.
出处
《系统工程理论与实践》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2004年第10期44-48,共5页
Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice
关键词
私人利益
过度投资
private benefits
over-investment
