股票期权制度的非显性约束

Analysis on the Non-dominant Restriction of Stock Option

新兴的一种有效的经理激励机制——股票期权制度,在魔法般地刺激了美国经济繁荣的同时,也激起了企业家经理人(CEO)无止境的贪欲,但是,股票期权制度没有达到其理想的效果。对股票期权制度的非显性约束机制包括:企业的声誉机制、企业文化、社会制度约束等。

This thesis analyzes why stock option, a newly-devised effective executive motivation system, magically stimulated a booming U.S. economy and titillated the voracity of the CEOs, and why the stock option system failed to achieve the most desirable results. It also discusses how to take effective restriction measures, in particular, non-dominant restrictions, to tackle the problem, and proposes policy changes for lifting the obstacles against the stock option system in line with the actual conditions in China.