摘要
国家与产权的关系决定着一国的长期经济绩效。国家介入产权内生于产权排他性对强制性力量的需求,起初,维护产权排他性的力量是通过各种社会机制提供的,但产权的演进最终将这种力量安排由国家来提供。但是,国家成为强制力量的合法垄断者以后,它可能维护产权,推进经济发展;也可能侵害产权,引起经济衰退。因此,对国家进行有效约束是保证经济持续增长的一个基本条件。但产权对国家的有效约束依赖于社会结构的转型。
The relationship between State and property can determine the long economic performance of a country. The root of government getting involved in property right is the exclusiveness and compulsory nature of property. Initially, it defended itself through every possible social institution; but at last with the evolution of properties, the state became the legal defender. Anyway, although the government protects property from violation and promotes economic development, it misappropriates properties and might cause economic stagnation. Therefore, to restrict government activities in this area may be imortant to guarantee continuous economic growth. The effective restriction through property will depend upon social structural transition.
出处
《南开学报(哲学社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2004年第6期76-84,共9页
Nankai Journal:Philosophy,Literature and Social Science Edition
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究项目(01JB790002)
关键词
产权
排他性
国家
契约
Property
Exclusiveness
State
Contract