60年代美国对中苏冲突事件的观念演变及其对华政策

America's Evolving Understanding of the Sino-Soviet Conflict and its China Policy in the 1960s

20世纪 5 0年代 ,美国一心想分化中苏同盟 ,争取中国脱离苏联 ,学术界对此早有研究 ,但 6 0年代 ,当中苏分裂真正发生后 ,美国却逐步改变了对这一事件的看法 ,这是被史学家们忽视的问题 ,肯尼迪和约翰逊政府对中苏分裂事件的观念经历了一个复杂的演变过程。肯尼迪政府执政之初曾短暂地认为 ,美国争取中国脱离苏联符合自己的利益 ,并于 1 96 2年底提出过所谓对中国“微开门”的方针。但进入 1 96 3年后 ,美国决策者开始挑选自己的“头号敌人” ,最终他们错误地选择了中国充当这一角色。 6 0年代美国民主党政府之所以未能跨出对华政策的关键一步与其对中国的偏见是分不开的。

During the 1950s the US hoped to split up the Sino Soviet alliance and win China away from the Soviet Union. Although this topic has long been subject to academic research, Americas changing views after China and the Soviet Union actually split have been neglected by historians. The Kennedy and Johnson administrations understanding of the Sino Soviet split underwent a complex evolution. In the early days of Kennedys presidency, his administration briefly believed that winning China away from the Soviet Union suited US interests, and in late 1962 it proposed a policy of `slightly opening the door to China. But into 1963 US policy makers began reconsidering their `enemy number one, and they settled on China to play that role. The reason why Democratic administrations in the 1960s were unable to make a key break in their China policies was inseparable from their skewed assessments of China.