摘要
在新一轮国有经济调整中,各地方政府纷纷出台"用两年左右的时间,通过民营资本和外资重组国企实现国有资本退出竞争性领域"的国资改革政策。本文通过考察我国企业资本的所有制结构,论证了上述政策的不可行性。本文认为在管制措施将资金的主要提供者———居民排除在国资转让市场之外的条件下,推行国资退出势必造成大规模的国有资产流失。而杠杆式收购和MBO并不能够使非公有制资本具备承接国资退出的实力。
In the new round innovation of state-owned economy, local governments issued innovation policy of state-owned capital in succession: State-owned capital realizes withdrawal from competitive fields via private and foreign capital's reconstruction of state-owned enterprise in about 2 years. Based on a review of capital ownership structure of Chinese enterprises this paper analyzes the unfeasibility of the aforementioned policy. The author considers that pushing the withdrawal of state-owned capital must bring on state-owned capital big loss when the regulation excludes the resident from state-owned capital transaction market, who is the main supplier of capital. While LBO and MBO can not make non state-owned capital have the power, over which take the withdrawal of state-owned capital.
出处
《中国软科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2004年第11期62-68,共7页
China Soft Science