跨国公司在华合资企业股权结构变动的成因——基于一个合作博弈模型的分析

An Analysis of the Causes of Ownership Structure Variation of Sino-foreign Joint Ventures in China: A Cooperative Game Model

文章从资产专有性理论出发,通过构建合资双方的合作博弈模型,分析了近年来跨国公司在华合资企业独资倾向的成因。文章认为,由于东道国的政策管制,合资企业股权与合资双方的实际控制权并不一致;合资企业的控制权分配取决于在既定市场条件下合资双方拥有资产的专有性,而控制权的分配又决定了合资双方对合资企业创造的组织租金的分配比例。当合资企业的股权结构和控制权结构相背离时,由于存在转移成本,合资双方有内在的动力使它们趋于一致。近年来跨国公司在华合资企业股权结构的变动是在我国开放程度不断扩大的环境下,跨国企业资产专有性相对提高和中方企业资产专有性相对减弱的必然结果。

Based on the literatures of exclusive assets, we form a improved two-side cooperative game model that gives the causes of the ownership structure variation of Sino-foreign joint-ventures in China. The control-right allocation of a joint venture depends on the bargaining power of proportions of the surplus. The ownership structure of joint ventures is restricted by the regulations of the governments of the home countries. The ownership proportion of a joint-venture is not always consistent with its real control-right allocation, however, both sides of a joint-venture have impetus to make them consistent.