大战略集博弈的适应性均衡及其求法

The Adaptive Equilibrium and Its Solution to Large-strategy-Sets Games

“象棋博弈之谜”表明 ,当一个博弈的战略集大到超过人的有限理性、有限计算能力和有限时间时 ,这个博弈呈现复杂的特性 ,因此 ,按照“最优战略选择”的常规办法无法求出其均衡解 ,必须借助复杂性理论的办法。一种可行的办法是借助复杂适应系统理论 (CAS) ,通过定义生成战略的规则集并对其进行信用分派 ,并以此对大战略集中的战略进行信用评估 ,将大战略集转化为一个小战略集———高信用战略子集 ,从而通过按常规方法求出小战略集博弈的均衡解来求出大战略集博弈的适应性均衡解。这种适应性均衡是一种魏里希型联合自我支持的 ,可能不是最优但是在复杂性下可行的稳定均衡。

The riddles of chess game indicate, according to the normal solution of Nash equilibrium, a game has not a solution to its equilibrium that one or more of its strategy sets are enough large to bounded rationality, capability of calculating and time of human as it appears complex characteristic. In virtue of complex adaptive system theory (CAS), defining the rules set that builds strategies and making credit assignment, evaluating the credit strength of the strategies in the large-strategy-set, transforming from large-strategy-sets to small-strategy-sets, namely strategy subsets of high credit strength, that is a viable way to transform solution from the adaptive equilibrium on large-strategy-sets game to of the equilibrium on small-strategy-sets game. the adaptive equilibrium is a sort of equilibrium based on complexity, that is Weirich-type united self-sustained, feasible and stable but possible dominant.