组织声誉与契约的隐形要求权——一个关于企业声誉的讨论

Corporation Reputation and Implicit Claims

本文拟从经济学中契约理论的观点,来解释公司声誉和公司价值之间的关系。企业的任何一项市场交易都可以看成是由商品契约或要素契约所组成的,而且这些契约都要涉及到两种权利,即显形要求权和隐形要求权。显形要求权的含义比较明确,而隐形要求权反映的是一些在任何契约中所不能明确表明的承诺,或不能写进契约中的一些权利。本文认为企业的隐形要求权是分析和透视企业声誉的最佳方法。尽管隐形要求权没有明确的法律地位,但却有经济价值。因此,声誉的价值就可以通过隐形要求权的价值予以观察,而且这种价值与公司价值密切相关。

From the perspective of contract theory, the paper explains the relation between corporation and its value. We argue that in selling a product or service or purchasing inputs, companies issue both explicit claims and implicit claims. Implicit claims have a value only if stakeholders will believe the company will honor them. It is in this context that reputation generates value to firms. The paper suggests that corporate reputation should be viewed through the lens of implicit contracts.