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证券市场中的信息、自律管理与监管 被引量:1

The Information, Self-regulation Supervision and Management
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摘要 为消除信息使用的外部效应 ,拥有信息私有产权的券商在与投资者的竞争中会形成一套内控制度来约束自己的行为 ;同时在券商之间的竞争中 ,会通过合约来相互转让信息 ,为进一步降低个别签约中的交易费用 ,券商会共同签定一个具有普遍约束力的合约来规范信息的生产过程 ,内控制度与具有普遍约束力的合约共同构成了证券经纪活动中的自律管理。 Securities firms, for the sake of the maximum of profit by stimulating the transaction of investors, actively provide information to the investors. And also, securities firms owning the private property rights of information, in order to get rid of external effects in use of information, form a set of interior control mechanism to restrict their own behaviors in competition with investors. Furthermore, in the competition among securities firms, contracts are used to convey in formation and consequently, securities firms co-sign a general constraint contract to standardize the process of production of information to decrease the transaction costs of some individual contracts. As the result, interior control mechanism and general constraint contracts constitute self-regulation of securities firms. To reduce the operation costs of self -regulation contracts, self-regulation contracts will be evolved into regulatory supervision measures in the forms of legislation or administrial supervision by governments. The critical point of transition from self-regulation to regulatory supervision should be determined by transaction costs under the conditions of restrictions, say, allocation effects, the capabilities of standardization and the estimated degree of damages.
作者 陈野华 甘煜
出处 《财经科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2005年第1期29-36,共8页 Finance & Economics
关键词 证券市场 自律管理 监管机制 证券经纪商 信息管理 securities information self-regulation regulation traction cost contract
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