政府收费的博弈分析

Game analysis of government charge

政府收费作为一种制度安排应放在财政交易制度的框架中进行分析。政府收费由于解决了公共物品融资博弈中的不合作难题,因而具有存在的合理性;政府收费单位具有违规使用收费资金的动机。财政部门与收费单位的博弈分析表明财政部门应介入收费资金的监管并应尽量减少监管成本,加强处罚力度;在收费权限的划分上,中央与地方两级政府共同管理是博弈矩阵中的纳什均衡。

Hong-ming Government charge as stipulated by rules should be analyzed in the framework of fiscal exchange institutions. Government fee is reasonable for settling in-coordination problems in games of public goods finance. Analyses of games between finance departments and fee collectors show that finance departments should intervene in monitoring funds collected, reduce monitoring costs as much as possible and increase the strength of penalty because official fee collectors are motivated to use the fund collected against rules. As for the limits of authority in fee collecting, the two-leveled administration by both the central government and local governments is a Nash balance in the matrix of games.