我国银行业风险与存款保险制度的完善

China's Banking Risk and Perfection of Deposit Insurance System

在银行业即将对外全面开放之际,我国银行业潜伏着巨大危机。我国所谓的"隐性存款保险制度"不是一个公平的、有效的防范银行业风险和提高银行管理水平的制度。因此,应实行强制性存款保险制度并根据银行不同风险暴露实行差别性存款保险费率,从而规避保险制度中普遍存在的逆向选择和道德风险问题。

Under the tremendous pressure of tougher foreign competition in the years to come, China's weak banking system has been undergoing fundamental reforms and is now becoming more and more vulnerable. But the so-called'implicit deposit insurance system', as implied by governmental actions in dealing with distressed banks, is unable to provide a fair and efficient institutional framework to tackle the great risks in China's banking system. The author recommends the establishment of compulsory deposit insurance system with discriminatory premiums based on risk exposure of depository institutions to eliminate the widespread problems of adverse selection and moral hazard in insurance system.