摘要
建立了一个能考虑输电网络约束的区域双边电力市场线性供应函数均衡(LSFE)模型,并分析了在传输线路发生不同阻塞情形时,有套利和无套利不同的假设对发电商市场力、市场平均电价和网络所有者的不同影响。采用基于非线性互补方法的改进的 Levenberg-Marquardt 算法来求解均衡解。30节点的 IEEE 测试系统计算结果表明,套利者的出现可以起到降低市场电价、限制发电商市场力的作用,同时有利于整个市场社会福利和消费者利益的提升。
Linear supply function equilibrium (LSFE) model considering transmission constraints for regional bilateral electricity power market is developed in this paper. Based on this model, it has been analyzed that under different transmission constraints the arbitrager can exert different influence on many facts of the power market such as the market power of suppliers, the average price of the regional bilateral electricity markets and the network holder. An inexact Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm based on the nonlinear complementary approach is used to solve the equilibrium solution. IEEE 30-bus test system is employed as an example, and the computational results show that the existence of arbitragers in the regional bilateral electricity markets can reduce the market price, restrict the market power of suppliers, meanwhile. It can also promote the total social welfare of markets and the consumer surplus.
出处
《电力系统自动化》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2005年第2期8-12,49,共6页
Automation of Electric Power Systems
基金
国家自然科学基金(50377023
50107006)上海市教委发展基金资助项目(02AK21)
关键词
区域双边电力市场
输电约束
线性供应函数均衡模型
套利
非线性互补方法
Competition
Cost benefit analysis
Electric power transmission networks
Enterprise resource planning
Game theory
Marketing
Mathematical models
Nonlinear systems
Optimization