审计师与管理者博弈下的审计独立性与审计质量——结合纵横国际的分析

Auditor Independence and Audit Quality Analysis under tbe Game Hieory——A Case Study on Tonmac International

审计独立性与审计质量始终是审计研究领域的核心问题。独立性作为注册会计师执行审计业务的灵魂,它不仅是客观、公正的前提,还直接影响着审计报告的质量。避开审计师的法律责任、审计定价、事务所规模、审计意见等传统讨论基点,本文采用纵横国际事件,试图结合制度安排分析并借助于博弈论的思想,从审计师与公司管理者的较量角度重新审视审计独立性与审计质量二者的关系。分析认为:制度对审计独立性和审计质量的影响并不是直接的,它通过影响审计师在与客户管理当局的博弈中的决策行为而对审计独立性发挥作用,然后带来审计质量的变化。

This paper presents an analytical framework that explores the relationship between auditor independence and audit quality.The framework is particularly concerned with the application of the Game Theory to analyze the conflict between auditors and corporation managers. Independence is the most important requirement for auditor due to its extensive influences over audit quality. In this paper, we are also focused on the impact of Institutional Arrangements on independence and audit quality.