激励销售与准确预测的薪酬机制设计

A Compensation Plan for Inciting and Accurately Predicting Sales

由于销售人员具有比厂商更多的销售信息,厂商在制定生产计划时需要参考来自销售人员的市场预测。传统的薪酬机制在引导销售人员如实上报预测量方面存在严重不足。Gonik机制虽然可以部分地弥补这一不足,但仍然要由厂商先提供参考定额和相应奖金数值。本文发展了一种不需要厂商提供参考定额值而直接由销售人员自己参与提出定额确定奖金并努力销售的薪酬机制。文章论证了它的有效性,并导出了在设计合同参数时,需要注意的一些规则和约束,对实际操作有一定的指导意义。

Firms may improve their production plans by using the information from salesmen who possess better knowledge about their own territories' sales than the central managers. Traditional compensation plans often fail to let the salesmen accurately report the sale prospect. The Gonik scheme might partly remedy the deficiency, but the planners who use it have to provide reference quota and relevant bonus volume at first. This paper develops a compensation plan under which salesmen will directly decide their actual quota without the guide of planners' reference quota and work hard to fulfill it. The article proves the plan' s efficiency and derives several regulations and constraints on selecting plan's parameters, which are of instructive values for practical operation.