加入招商引资行为的税收竞争模型

Tax Competition with Investment Invitation as an Investment

招商引资是一种具有中国特色的政府行为,现有文献对此没有专门论述。本文运用非合作静态博弈模型分析了政府如何综合运用招商引资和税率这两种手段进行税收竞争,并揭示了公共产品差异、投资对选址的敏感程度以及招商手段的效率对均衡税率和均衡招商引资水平的影响。本文证明了在政府运用招商引资和降低实际税率两种手段进行税收竞争情况下的一系列结论:参与横向税收竞争的地方政府越多,均衡税率就会越低;当地方政府增加到一定数目时,政府的招商引资投入将大于社会最优时的招商投入;政府选择招商水平的标准是使招商引资的边际收益等于边际成本;招商手段效率越高均衡税率越低;各地区非税收因素对投资利润影响很大时,一味减税并不能有效地吸引投资;流动性较低的要素会承受一个高的均衡税率。

This paper uses a noncooperative static game model to analyze tax competition between local governments. In this model, each government utilizes two instruments, tax rate and investment invitation, to attract mobile capital. We find that the more the local governments engaging in tax competition, the lower the tax rate set in noncooperative equilibrium; the cost of investment invitation set in Nash equilibrium is larger than that in social optimum when the number of local governments is sufficiently large; the criterion for a rational government to choose the level of investment invitation is that the marginal gain be equal to the marginal cost; the improved efficiency of investment invitation causes the tax rate to fall; if the non-monetary factors play an important role to affect the profits of the capital, only lowering the tax rate on capital can not attract investment efficiently; the lower the mobility of an factor, the higher the tax rate a government levies on it.