面向医院的激励机制研究

RESEARCHES ON INCENTIVE SYSTEM BASED ON HOSPITAL

通过对医、患、保三方关系的分析,指出医方在医疗保险体系中具有核心地位,并根据委托代理理论和激励机制理论,建立了面向医院的激励机制,以促进医疗服务质量的提高和有效控制医疗费用的过快增长;另一方面,根据按服务项目付费可能导致的医患合谋现象,建立了防范医患同谋的激励机制,指出防范医患同谋的关键在于提高医生的保留效用,改善医生收入。

By the analysis of the social insurance system involving hospitals, insurees and insurers, and the doctors being the center of the system , by virtue of principal-agent theory and incentive system theory, the incentive system based on hospital is structured firstly, so as to advance the medical service and control the medical fees effectively. At the same time, incentive system preventing the doctor-patient collusion is structured owing to the collusion existing in diagnosis and treatment, and it is pointed out that the characteristic of the system is to increase the doctor's reserve utility and improve the doctor's income.