独立董事对信息披露的博弈分析

The Game Analysis on INDS and Information Disclosure

本文从博弈的角度出发,就上市公司与独立董事在信息披露方面进行了博弈分析,分析了独立董事监督上市公司时所考虑的成本因素,只有当独立董事制度充分发挥作用,成为一种纳什均衡时,独立董事制度才会发挥效用。

From the angle of Game,this paper analyzed whether listed company ca n disclose information truly and whether the INDS can supervise the anthenticity of information disclosure efficiently.the Game indicated that list company's f alse accounting information disclosure efficiently can be prevented only by INDS 's independence and supervisal level.