国有企业的经理人激励机制与经济回报

Incentive Mechanism of Stated-owned Enterprises' Managers and Economic Returns

国有企业经理人的激励机制一直是国有企业改革理论研究与实践的重点问题。根据经理人激励机制的单期静态模型及两期动态模型分析可知,不同的国有企业经理人激励机制下将识别经理人的不同能力水平和努力程度,对政府也将产生不同的经济回报。

Incentive Mechanism of stated-owned enterprises' managers has been a cruci al issue of theory and practice in the reform of stated-owned enterprises. After analyzing single-period static model and double-period dynamic model, the autho r points out that different managers' incentive Mechanisms can produce different managerial efforts and economic returns to governments.