委托—代理理论与供应链激励机制的研究

Principal-Agent Theory and the Research of Incentives in Supply Chain

信息不对称引起委托代理问题,供应链企业间由于信息不对称也存在着委托代理问题。特别是随着供应链管理研究的日益深化,企业之间的委托代理关系日益突出,如何协调这种委托代理关系,制定并处理好各个利益成员之间的激励问题成为供应链管理的主要问题之一。本文在分析委托—代理理论及其模型的基础上,对如何建立合理的激励机制提出了自己的看法与分析。

The principal-agent exists in the enterprise of supply chain caused by incomplete information. Moreover the relationship is becoming prominent for the research of supply chain management in-depth. How to concord the relationship of principal-agent, make and deal with the incentives around all the interest-members have become one of the important question in supply chain management. This paper analyzes principal-agent theory and its model. On the base the paper presents the attitude on how to establish reasonable incentives mechanism.