基于道德风险防范的建设工程管理机制探讨

Mechanism of construction project management based on moral hazard prevention

阐述了工程建设中道德风险的形成原因,建立了业主、监理和承包方的混合战略纳什均衡模型,指出了业主监督成本、监理努力工作追加成本和承包方攻关成本在均衡时与成本期望收益的无差异关系。以此为基础,分析了监理与承包方舞弊时的处罚额度,确立了业主监督成本的计算方法,讨论了监理激励系数的选取依据。这对建设工程管理机制的设计是有益的。

Explains the reason of moral hazard occurrence in project construction, forms the mixed strategies Nash equilibrium model of owner, supervisor and contractor, and points out the quantity equilibrium between owner's control cost, supervisor's additional labor cost, contractor's bribery cost and their expected profits while the Nash equilibrium is realized. Based on these, the supervisor and contractor's fine due to their fault is respectively analyzed, the owner's control cost is calculated, and the supervisor's incentive degree is also discussed. These are beneficial to the mechanism design of construction project management.