经济转型中的地方政府经济行为变异分析

Analysis on Distortion of Local Governments' Economic Behaviors in Economic Transition of China

本文围绕我国经济转型期相对“软化”的制度约束环境、中央与地方政府之间的委托—代理关系以及地方政府间“准联邦式”竞争关系这三条分析线索,应用“激励变异”和“代理变异”两个概念,结合中国改革路径的渐进式特点,对地方政府经济行为的变异进行描述、分析和概括。基本结论是:转型期地方政府所面临的相对“软化”的制度约束环境导致其产生激励变异;缺乏微观主体有效监督和约束的上下级政府间直接的委托—代理关系导致其产生代理变异;“准联邦式”政府间竞争强化和放大了地方政府上述行为的变异程度。

This paper studied the distortion of the local governments' economic behaviors in economic transition of China. The author analyzed on the degree which the property rights system, the relationship of principal-agent between the central government and local governments, and the quasi-federal contest among local governments. The author concluded that the distortion of the local governments' economic behaviors in economic transition of China was the outcome of the gradualism of the China reformation. The weak property rights system to the local governments in economic transition induced the distortion of the local governments' economic behaviors, the absence of the monitor to the principal-agent between the central government and local governments by the micro-agents induced the distortion of agent behavior, and the quasi-federal contest among local governments enlarged the distortion of the local governments' behavior.