国有控股、经营者变更和公司绩效被引量：48

State Holding, Turnover of Uppermost Decision-maker and Firm Performance

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摘要本文从国有控股上市公司董事长职业生涯考虑角度,研究董事长变更和绩效的关系。发现董事长免职和公司绩效恶化正相关,控股股东对董事长的考核以长期绩效和相对绩效(相对于前任董事长)为主,董事长任期和免职负相关,和控股股东的良好关系可以降低董事长被免职的概率。研究表明,国有控股上市公司经营者变更的激励模式与国际公众公司相近。 This paper focuses on career concerns of chairman of directors of state-holding corporations, and analyzes the relationship between board chairman's turnover and performance. The result of this paper shows that chairman termination is positively related to poor performance, that the evaluation rules of controlling shareholder are mainly long-term absolute performance and performance which is relative to that of predecessor, in addition the tenure of chairman is negatively related to termination, and that good connections with controlling shareholder can reduce the probability of termination. This paper concludes that uppermost decision-maker's turnover incentive mode of State-holding Corporation is close to that of international public company.

作者宋德舜宋逢明

机构地区清华大学经济管理学院

出处《南开管理评论》 CSSCI 2005年第1期10-15,34,共7页 Nankai Business Review

关键词董事长公司绩效国有控股上市公司控股股东经营者公众公司激励模式免职变更任期 State Holding Decision-maker Turnover Ca Concerns Firm Performance

分类号 F224 [经济管理—国民经济]

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参考文献16

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