摘要
运用委托——代理理论对旅游规划市场的业主与旅游规划编制方之间的关系进行了深入分析 ,指出信息不对称和利益的多向性是旅游规划产品质量问题的根源 ;建议构建旅游规划监理制度来弱化旅游规划市场上的信息不对称 ,抑制逆向选择和道德风险 。
The principal-agent relationship between employer and tourism planning provider was analyzed by applying principal-agent theory. This paper pointed out that information asymmetry and incentive incompatibility was the resource of the low quality tourism-planning products. In order to reduce information asymmetry, reverse section and moral hazard, a suggestion on structuring tourism planning supervision institution was put forward. The probability of the operation of this suggestion was discussed as well.
出处
《桂林旅游高等专科学校学报》
2005年第1期88-92,共5页
Journal of Guilin Institute of Tourism
关键词
旅游规划
监理制度
委托代理
tourism-planning
supervision institution
principal-agent
