摘要
本文介绍了中央银行独立性概念及其理论模型,作者认为对不同类型的国家央行独立性应以不同的理论模型来解释,我国央行独立性更适宜采用铸币税型动态不一致来描述。本文按照不同类型的国家分析了央行独立性对宏观经济的作用,并探讨了关于加强我国央行独立性的若干问题。
This paper reviews definitions and models of central bank independence (CBI), and shows that CBI in different countries should be explained by different models. Dynamic inconsistency of seigniorage is the most appropriate model to describe CBI in China. This paper classifies macroeconomic effects of CBI, and some key issues of ~China's CBI improvement are discussed.
出处
《金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2005年第1期32-42,共11页
Journal of Financial Research