摘要
当宏观经济进入衰退阶段,由于商业银行的资本充足率下降、信贷环境恶化,商业银行为实现自身利益最大化目标,其最优选择行为是发生较为严重的信贷配给行为,这将导致融资企业的信贷可得性下降。由于融资企业信贷可得性的直接影响和间接影响,将会引起融资企业及其相关企业的投资下降,在乘数效应和加速原理的相互作用下,其结果是宏观经济衰退更加严重,宏观经济陷入经济衰退与信贷配给相互作用的恶性循环中,宏观经济衰退的程度会进一步加大。当宏观经济进入繁荣阶段,具有与上述相类似的相反过程。可见,信贷配给是宏观经济波动的加速器。我国商业银行的信贷配给呈现关系型信贷配给的特征,具有两方面的作用一是自发抑制宏观经济波动,二是拉长货币政策发挥作用的时滞。
When macroeconomy goes into recession stage, commercial banks usually take credit rationing as the best measure to maximize their own interest. And accordingly it is difficult for enterprises to get credit loans from the bank because of insufficient of commercial ~bank's capital. Then the consequent result of is that the macroeconomy is further deteriorated. Therefore, credit rationing is an accelerator of the macroeconomy fluctuation. The paper points out that the credit rationing of ~China's commercial banks has two functions, one is to voluntarily balance the macroeconomic fluctuation, the other is to prolong the time lag of monetary policy.
出处
《金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2005年第1期74-81,共8页
Journal of Financial Research
基金
中国博士后科学基金资助项目(2003034238)
国家自然科学基金资助项目(N7001161950)的阶段性成果。