摘要
This paper is focusing on the interaction between the senior managers of a firm for a long-term, which is of high uncertainty. By doubting and improving the theory of residual control and public domain, the paper reveals the micro-mechanism of a long-term-game between the senior managers of the firm in condition of an incomplete contract by using the analysis of coordination game.In general,we can summarize the long-term-game into the pendulous equilibrium of coordination game.
This paper is focusing on the interaction between the senior managers of a firm for a long-term, which is of high uncertainty. By doubting and improving the theory of residual control and public domain, the paper reveals the micro-mechanism of a long-term-game between the senior managers of the firm in condition of an incomplete contract by using the analysis of coordination game. In general, we can summarize the long-term-game into the pendulous equilibrium of coordination game.
出处
《社会》
北大核心
2005年第1期67-98,共32页
Chinese Journal of Sociology
关键词
企业管理
企业理论
理论框架
剩余控制权
game, residual control, coordination game, pendulous equilibrium
