权力寻租的新制度经济学分析

New Institutional Economics Analyses of Power Rent Seeking

本文从新制度经济学角度简要分析了权力寻租产生的根源 ,认为应实现公共产品供给与生产的分离 ,打破政府垄断 ,以切断寻租的源头。指出权力寻租赖以存在的土壤在于渐进式改革过程中制度设计的失当 ,强调在制度设计中要强调利益主体之间责、权、利的相互制衡关系以化解利益主体的冲突。通过对导致权力寻租的制度漏洞分析 ,提出了相应制度创新对策 ,进一步提出要进行体制改革和制度创新 ,建立结构合理、配置科学、程序严密、相互制约的权力运行机制 。

After briefly analyzing the root of power rent-seeking from the viewpoint of new institutional economics, the article argue for separation of supply and production of public goods and, breaking government monopoly down to cut off the root of seeking rent. Improper system design in gradual reform process brings the fried for power rent seeking, so the balance and restrict of duties, rights, and interests between different parts must be imposed on system design. By analyzing the faults of system, the article puts forward that power rent-seeking can only be eliminated by the reform and innovation of system with building a power function system of appropriate structure, scientific collocation, strict procedure and restrict of each other.