规制机制设计在环境政策中的应用评述

Opinion on Using Regulation Mechanism Design in Environment Policy

环境政策中的一个主要问题是规制者和被规制者之间的信息不对称问题。由于规制者和被规制的代理人之间的目标不同,且被规制企业的所得受规制政策的影响,因而他们之间的信息交流受制于策略操纵。机制设计理论为这一问题的解决提供了一种思路,但由于它所暗含的零信息交流成本假设,作为庇古方法的一个复杂版本,其效力大大削弱。对不同环境政策工具的有效性的争论,也就必然回到科斯与庇古传统之间的争论。在讨论环境政策工具的有效性时,必须考虑信息成本,而且应该分类实施。

A key problem of environment policy is information unsymmetrical between the regulator and the regulated. Because deputies of them have different aim, and the regulated enterprise is influenced by the regulator policy, the information exchange between them is enslaved to tactic control. Mechanism design theories provide a kind of thinking for this problem solution, but because a crytic hypothesis of zero information exchanges cost, as a complex edition of classical method, its effect consumedly weaken. Controversy of different environment policy tool's validity consequentially returns to controversy between Caose and classicality. So, at discussion environment policy too's validity, the information cost must be considered, and the tool should be put in practice according to its sort.