摘要
上海和深圳证券交易所占据了中国证券市场的核心地位,并且承担了相当的监管职能。但是理论上对于交易所监管功能性质的模糊认识,导致实践中采取了一些可能阻碍交易所监管功能发挥的做法。本文试图从企业组织角度重新认识和分析交易所,揭示交易所履行监管功能的本质在于追逐自身利益最大化,因此监管功能为交易所提供服务的主要内容之一,但交易所的监管也存在片面维护自己利益的缺陷。只有保持充分竞争的压力,交易所的监管功能才能得到有效发挥。因此,维持交易所的充分竞争环境,是中国证券交易所监管功能有效发挥的必要条件。
Shanghang Securities Exchange and Shenzhen Securities Exchange are important regulators in Chinese securities market. But there are some wrong understandings of the role the exchanges played. If we view exchange as a firm, we can find that the regulation is an internal function of exchange. But to limit the shortcoming of the self-regulation, we need keep the pressure of competition. So in Chinese securities market, the important thing is to increase competition between two securities exchanges, not to reduce it.
出处
《中国法学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2005年第1期83-90,共8页
China Legal Science