罗蒂知识观批判——兼论认识论的语用学转向

A Critique to Richard Rorty's Conception of Knowledge--And On the Pragmatics Turn of Epistemology

在罗蒂和BarryAllen关于认识论和人类知识展开的争论中,Allen不满于罗蒂知识观之拘执于命题和对话,提出了一种强调体现在各种人工制品中的"knowing-how"之源始性的认识论。本文运用波兰尼传统和维特根斯坦传统的思想资源来支持Allen的立场,论证了"knowing-how"对于"knowing-that"的优先性,并由此主张超越罗蒂的商谈的、对话版本的"单薄"的知识观,倡导一种作为认识论的语用学转向之结果的"厚实"的知识观。

In a controversy on epistemology and human knowledge between Richard Rorty and Barry Allen, an epistemology in emphasizing the origin of 'knowing-how' in various artifacts at present, owing to his discontent of restriction to proposition and dialogue in Rorty's conception of knowledge. This article, taking the ideological resources of Polanyian and Wittgensteinian tradition to support Allen's position, expounds the priority of 'knowing-how' over 'knowing-that', and thus proposes to transcend Rorty's 'thinner' one as the result of epistemological turn to pragmatics.