非对称信息下的制度激励与信号显示

Institutional Incentives and Signaling in Unbalanced Information System

经济学理论已经对激励有相当的研究,尤其信息经济学的非对称信息下契约设计激励的研究成果,在实践中得以广泛应用。机会主义行为是制度产生的内在原因。本文指出制度是较低层次的马斯洛需要,制度必然产生激励。信号是制度与激励的桥梁,适当的信号设计对激励的结果尤为重要。当信号成本不足以区别和分类代理人时,最终形成混合均衡。适当地信号设置,对政策制定有重要意义。

While the study of incentives, especially contract-oriented incentives in the unbalanced information system, has accomplished considerable achievement and been applied in general economic practices, institutional incentives, which are based on opportunist behavior and the Maslow wants at a lower scale, have not yet attracted due attention. The present paper analyses the significance of signaling in bridging institution and incentives, concluding that signaling that is insufficient to differentiate agents will eventually result in mixed balance, and that due signaling is vital in establishing institutions.