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从制度上完善官员引咎辞职的动力机制 被引量:5

Perfecting the Incentive Mechanism of Official' s Taking the Blame and Resignation from the Institutional Aspects
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摘要 在缺乏外在压力的情况下,失职官员往往很难当机立断作出辞职的自觉选择。要使有咎必辞、有责必究、有过必罚形成惯例,需要从制度上进一步完善失职官员引咎辞职的动力机制。 Without external pressure, the official breaching of one's duty very often is quite difficult to make the conscientious and prompt decision to take the blame and resign from one's post. In order to form the convention for official who neglects one's duty taking leave, assuming one's responsibility, and bearing one's punishment, it needs to further improve the incentive mechanism for officials to take the blame and resign from the institutional aspects.
作者 蒋云根
机构地区 华东师范大学
出处 《天津行政学院学报》 2005年第1期41-44,共4页 Journal of Tianjin Administration Institute
关键词 引咎辞职 压力 动力 Take the blame and resign Pressure Incentive
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