摘要
We present a model based on Computational Temporal Logic (CTL) methods forverifying security requirements of electronic commerce, protocols. The model describes formally theauthentication, confidentiality integrity, non-repudiation) denial of serviee and access control ofthe e-lectronic commerce protocols. We illustrate as case study a variant of the Lu-Smolka protocolproposed by Lu-Smolka Moreover, we have discovered two attacks that allow a dishonest user topurchase a good debiting the amountto another user. And also, we compared our work with relativeresearch works and found lhat the formal way of this paper is more general to specify securityprotocols for E-Commerce.
We present a model based on Computational Temporal Logic (CTL) methods forverifying security requirements of electronic commerce, protocols. The model describes formally theauthentication, confidentiality integrity, non-repudiation) denial of serviee and access control ofthe e-lectronic commerce protocols. We illustrate as case study a variant of the Lu-Smolka protocolproposed by Lu-Smolka Moreover, we have discovered two attacks that allow a dishonest user topurchase a good debiting the amountto another user. And also, we compared our work with relativeresearch works and found lhat the formal way of this paper is more general to specify securityprotocols for E-Commerce.
基金
Supported by the Natural Science Foundation ofthe Department of Education of Guangdong Province (Z03001)
