作为语词复制的“模仿”

Translation: Taking Philosophical Concept as Philosophical Word

文章旨在从文本翻译角度考察“模仿”问题。对这种语词复制过程的描述表明 ,由于不同语词构成物之间的不可还原性 ,译本对原本的翻译总会成为“差异的播撒”过程。这一观察对理解“哲学概念”具有重要意义 :虽然经典认识论一向认为哲学概念应当是纯粹的和普遍性的 ,但许多哲学概念的“不可翻译性”恰恰提示着一个重要的解释学结论 :哲学概念具有强烈的语词特性 。

Though the purpose of translation is to imitate the original text, rewording text A by text B always turns out to be a process of “the dissemination of differences”. This observation is subversive for our traditional understanding of philosophical concept. To translate a philosophical concept implies taking it as a philosophical word that is no longer something unconditionally pure or universal as it is claimed by classical epistemology. From this demonstration we draw a hermeneutical conclusion: philosophical concept dwells in the world of words.