关于可能世界视域中的名称与本质问题——兼评中西学者在相关领域中的学术论争

Name and essence in the framework of possible world

名称的摹状词理论坚持认为名称既有含义又有指称,而因果历史理论则坚持认为 专名和自然种类名称只有指称没有含义;亚里士多德的本质理论考察现实世界中的事物的本 质,克里普克的本质理论考察事物跨可能世界的本质。而我们则认为,若要合理地理解两种本 质理论,从而合理地把握两种名称理论,就必须认识到,在逻辑上,所有可能世界都是平权的,必 须取消现实世界的本位地位。

Descriptivist Theory of Name holds that names have both sense and referent, whereas Causal-Historical Theory of Name holds that proper names and natural material names have only referent; Aristotle’s Essentialism discusses essence in actual world, whereas Kripke’s Essentialism discusses essence across possible worlds. It was considered that these two kinds of viewpoints conflict with each other. With the framework of Possible Worlds and previous achievements concerned, the article argues that there is no so-called conflict. In the course of discussion, the author stresses the importance of social practices for the understanding of Name and Essence and clarifies some misconceptions.