浅析行贿受贿行为

On the Behavior of Bribing and Accepting Bribes

本文以理性经济人假设为立论前提,运用博弈模型、决策树和心理分析的方法对行贿受贿行为进行了动机分析,试图回答下列问题:人们为什么要行贿?公务员为什么会受贿?低薪为什么易导致"腐败"?怎样抑制行贿受贿现象的蔓延?并在此基础上提出"高薪养廉"、"健全法治"、"强化惩处"的政策主张。

Thispaper investigates the phenomenon of bribe and accepting bribe happened in civil servants (CS). For this purpose the hypothesis of 'Rational person seeking private interests'is analyzed and the framework of game theory is developed. A particular feature of this analysis is in order to answer the question: Is high- salary able to keep CS incorruptible? Theoretically and practically,we can give a'Yes'answer. The reasons are given in the paper: As a CS's legal income increases, he/she is less likely to accept bribe when other things being equal (this is important condition). If the expected cost of accepting bribe is higher than the past, which should eliminate some potential those who want to bribe. However, in order to fight against corruption, a society needs to do three things at the same time: 1) raises the absolute and relative salary of CS, 2) increase the chance to catch and punish those accepting bribes, and 3) punish them swiftly and severely. So the keypoint is the institution.