乡镇财政信息不对称问题及其制度安排

The Asymmetric Information Problems in Rural Finance and Its Institution Arrangement

根据公共选择原理,财政关系是典型的委托代理关系。像所有的委托代理关系一样,财政也同样存在信息不对称问题,如逆向选择、机会主义和道德风险问题,这些问题如果得不到有效控制和解决,势必影响财政对资源配置的效率,影响财政的正常运转,甚至引发政府财政危机。要想控制和消除乡镇财政信息不对称问题,必须建立财政信息披露机制和激励机制。

According to public choice theory,the financial relations are typical principal agent relations. As in the case of principal agent relations,the asymmetric information problems such as adverse selection,opportunism and the moral risk also exist in the financial field. If these problems can't be solved efficiently, they would affect the resource dispersal efficiency and the normal operation of the finance,even cause the financial crisis of government. We must establish information issue and incentive mechanism in the financial field to dominate and eliminate the asymmetric information problems.