摘要
广松涉通过批判地析取马赫哲学“复合感觉要素一元论” ,提出了主体与对象整体性、函数性功能关联的“场”及人们关于物体的概念符号是“共同主观性的意义形象”———“意义的所识”之命题。但马赫哲学在骨子里是主观唯心主义 ,然而它表现出来的却是“什么也是”、“什么也不是”的折衷主义 ,而其所谓关于“物”的“思想的缩约符号”(广松涉称其为与人的知觉及“对象的所与”相联系的“意义的所识”) ,因其失去了由实践到认识、由感性形象认识到抽象思维和理性认识的说明 ,也就难以得到科学的理解与把握。其实 ,这些关于对象世界的概念性称谓 ,只不过是人们在实践及感性认识的基础上通过反复实践。
In virtue of analysis Mach's “monism of sense element', Hiromatsu propose a newproposition, namely, subject and object entity, functional relative “field' and the conception sign of people about object are “meaningful image of common subjectivity '——the proposition of “the exposed of meaning '. But Mach philosophy is essentially subjective idealism, however, “as it appears everything' and 'as it appears nothing', indeed it is eclecticism, and that, for it lose explanation form practice to cognation, from sensibility knowledge to abstract thinking and rational knowledge, Mach's so-called abbreviation sign of thought about “thing' can't be scientifically understood. In fact, these notional appellations on object world is merely a kind of thinking mode that people rationally grasp the world on the ground of people practice and sensibility knowledge.
