摘要
监管当局对银行跨国并购的态度取决于银行跨国并购是否会带来净收益以及由此带来的净收益的归属问题。并购银行的CAR_3真为显性负相关,多数银行并购成本仍然过高。回归模型显示并购银行的CAR_3与系统风险和总风险都呈非相关关系。
This paper examined the announcement effects of cross-border mergers on acquirer's abnormal rerams. The CARs of acquiring banks were significantly negative. This result is consistent with acquiring banks overpaying for targets even in the presence of potential safety-net subsidies. In sum, the growth of cross-border banking appears to pose limited systemic risk dangers to the stability and solvency of the international banking system.
出处
《上海理工大学学报(社会科学版)》
2004年第2期3-6,共4页
Journal of University of Shanghai for Science and Technology:Social Sciences Edition