“避峰”现象中企业的行为分析及政府对策选择

Analysis of the Act of Firm and the Choice of Government in Time Sharing

用博弈论的方法,从最简单的赛局结构入手,逐步放松约束,分析了"避峰"现象中企业的特定行为模式,并以此为基础,分析了政府的对策空间和相应的约束条件,揭示了政府对违规企业所应施加的惩罚(罚款)取决于企业因投机所获的收益(M)、企业对未来的预期(P)和折现率(δ)这三个条件。

The paper begins with the simple structure of game and then relaxes the situations to analyses the special act of firm in Time Sharing. On the base of these, the paper analyses the choice of government and it's situations. The paper finds out that the firm's penalty given by the government is determined by three factors: the firm's profit gained from gamble (M), the firm's appreciation (P) and cash-conversion-rate(δ).