单阶段和多阶段激励博弈模型

One-stage and multi-stage game models for motivating

应用博弈论研究方法,建立了用来分析企业领导者对下属激励问题的单阶段和多阶段博弈模型。通过对模型的分析,领导者和下属双方的短视行为将导致两败俱伤的结果,在多次重复博弈中,领导者和员工重视的不是短期的得失,而是长期利益的获取,寻求长期合作才是双方理性的选择。领导者对暂时不合作的下属要根据下属的信用程度给予适当的机会,以期待下属与领导者的长期合作。对于信用程度差的下属,也不要给予多于一次的机会,以减少风险。

An one-stage and a multi-stage game model that describe a game of leader’s motivating subordinates is developed in the paper. Through analysis of the models, it is found that short-sight actions by both leaders and subordinates will result in failure on both sides. In the multi-stage game model, both leaders and subordinates prefer long term benefits to short term ones,. It is more rational that the both sides pursue long term return. For comcooperative subordinates in a short term, leaders should give them more opportunities for those behaving well to expect them to cooporate next time, and don’t give more than one time opportunity for those behaving badly to reduce the risk.