基于内生投标人的拍卖

Auctions Based on Endogenous Bidders

讨论了参与者是内生性的第一价格和第二价格密封拍卖的均衡报价策略 ,两种不同的拍卖形式产生相同的预期收入 ;由于中止值的存在 ,卖方预期收入可能随着潜在参与者的增加而减少 .对拍卖商来说 ,如果投标人是风险回避的 ,那么第一价格密封拍卖比第二价格密封拍卖产生更高的预期收益 .

This paper examines equilibrium bidding strategies and the seller′s expected revenue for both first and secondprice sealedbid auctions while participation is endogenous. When the number of potential bidders increases the expected revenue may decrease. Finally, we conclude that firstprice auctions generate more expected revenue than secondprice auctions when the bidders are riskaverse.