抵抗多次拦截攻击的量子密钥分发中的身份认证

Identity Verification in Quantum Key Distribution for Resisting Attack of Multi-Time Interceptions

指出多次拦截技术对于经典身份认证是无意义的,但是在设计量子身份认证协议时必须要考虑这种攻击手段,故认为主动攻击者利用多次拦截技术,可以测量携带身份信息的确定粒子的多个副本,准确地获得粒子的态,成功地攻破近年分别由DanielLjunggren和ZengGuihua等人发表的2个量子身份认证协议.给出的量子身份认证协议中引入了基于时间参数和认证密钥的伪随机序列,使攻击者进行的拦截次数只有达到时间参数长度的指数级,才能获得同一粒子的副本,逃避了多次拦截攻击.

The attack of multi-time interceptions must be considered in the protocols of quantum identity verification, though it makes no sense in its classical counterpart. By this means, an active attacker could precisely obtain the state of the particle carrying the identity verification information, when he measured enough copies of the particle. So the two protocols released lately by Daniel Ljunggren et al and Zeng Guihua et al respectively could be broken. Based on the pseudorandom bit generator with time parameters and the verification keys, the identity verification protocol in quantum key distribution proposed can avoid the attack because the attacker has to intercept exponential times in the length of time parameters to obtain just one copy of a particle.