风险企业中的产权安排:理论和启示

Property Rights Allocation in Venture Capital Backed Companies: Theory and Enlightenment

文章在阿洪和泰勒尔(Aghion and Tirole,1994)模型的基础上,发展了一个三阶段的动态博弈模型来研究产权安排与企业发展之间的关系,认为在风险企业这种以研发为核心的企业中,应该由风险企业家来决定产权比例,否则会影响其创新能力。当前中国风险投资机构改革的关键是加快国有资本的退出,实现产权结构的多元化,真正依靠市场机制来引导企业的发展。

Based on model of Aghion and Tirole (1994),This paper develops a three-stage dynamic game to study the relationship between property rights and enterprise development. The paper thinks that in the venture capital backed companies the core of which is R&D percentage of property rights allocation should be decided,or else the innovation ability will be influenced. Now the key to reform in Venture Capital setups is to withdraw state-owned capital and make the structure of property rights varied. The venture capital backed companies really rely on market mechanism to develop.